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Strategies of Model Building in
Population Genetics
Anya Plutynski†‡
In 1966, Richard Levins argued that there are different strategies in model building in
population biology. In this paper, I reply to Orzack and Sober’s (1993) critiques of
Levins and argue that his views on modeling strategies apply also in the context of
evolutionary genetics. In particular, I argue that there are different ways in which
models are used to ask and answer questions about the dynamics of evolutionary
change, prospectively and retrospectively, in classical versus molecular evolutionary
genetics. Further, I argue that robustness analysis is a tool for, if not confirmation,
then something near enough, in this discipline.
1. Introduction. There are two central aims in this paper. First, the aim
is to defend a sensible middle ground between Levins, on the one hand,
and Orzack and Sober on the issue of how different strategies of model
building in the sciences get us to, if not well-confirmed theories, then
something near enough. Second, this argument will be supported with
examples from classical and molecular evolutionary genetics.
In 1966, Levins famously argued that population biologists must trade
off generality, precision, and realism in model building. There is no “single,
best all-purpose model” (1966, 7). There are, rather, three strategies of
model building: modeling that sacrifices generality for the sake of realism
and precision (what he calls type I), modeling that sacrifices realism for
generality and precision (type II), and modeling that sacrifices precision
for generality and realism (type III). Levins’ argument is largely based on
examples, and he does not define his terms precisely, so it is rather difficult
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to determine whether his claims are true. Orzack and Sober reply to Levins
in a 1993 paper. They define the terms “generality,” “precision,” and
“realism” as follows:
(G) If one model applies to more real world systems than another,
it is more general.
(R) If one model takes account of more independent variables known
to have an effect than another model, it is more realistic.
(P) If a model generates point predictions for output parameters, it
is precise. (1993, 534)
Sober and Orzack argue that Levins is mistaken. They claim that there
are not necessarily trade-offs between these three virtues in model build-
ing. For instance, they show that one model may be both as general as
and more realistic (in their senses of the term) than a second model if,
for instance, the latter is a special case of the former. Thus, generality
and realism can be maximized simultaneously. (Their example is density-
independent versus density-dependent models of population growth. The
former can be “nested” in the latter. Or it is an instance of the more
general case: only the value of the variable describing the effects of density
is zero.) Moreover, they show how we may increase realism and make no
sacrifice in generality or precision to a model, simply by adding new
independent variables. In other words, they show how in some cases, at
least, it is possible to maximize all three virtues. The claim that these
trade-offs are inevitable seems to be defeated. They conclude:
Conflicts between models should be understood in terms of their
substance, not their styles. Levins’s thesis suggests that it is a matter
of taste which two of the three desiderata a scientist chooses to pur-
sue. If different models really did have different aspirations, it would
be a mistake to attempt to decide which model is best. Models in
different categories would then “go their own ways,” answerable to
their own standards. The perennial difficulties of understanding na-
ture make this pluralism a temptation. It is, however, a temptation
to be resisted. One way to do this is by separating models by their
assumptions and by their fit to the data. (1993, 545)
I agree with Sober and Orzack that if it were an implication of Levins’
view that models cannot be compared or evaluated or that which model
one prefers is a matter of taste, then we ought to reject Levins’ view.
However, it’s not clear that Levins’ account has this implication. I will
call this the “ham-fisted” reading of Levins.
I take it that there is a more subtle reading of Levins. This is the claim
that models serve different functions at different stages in the process of
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confirming theories. As Levins is at pains to emphasize in his reply, model
building is a process, and the process can be developed along different
lines to meet different needs in the process of better understanding how
the world works. (For excellent defenses of this interpretation, see Wimsatt
[1981, 2002], Odenbaugh [2004], and Weisberg [n.d.].)
In a reply to their 1993 paper, Levins calls Sober and Orzack’s approach
to theory building and confirmation a “formalized” one. Here is a sketch
of what I take this to mean. On Orzack and Sober’s view, we construct
models and then proceed to determine whether they fit the world. Better
or worse fit can be engineered by adding or removing variables, or making
models more or less realistic or precise. I don’t believe that Levins has
any conflict with Orzack and Sober over this characterization of model
building as a regulative ideal or in contexts in which we have a fairly
good understanding already of the system under investigation. However,
Levins’ account is closer to what scientists actually do in sciences such
as ecology or evolution, which investigate complex systems with many
moving parts. In such contexts, while one cannot always generate a model
that accurately represents such a system in all its details (indeed, doing
so might be computationally impossible), one can answer a number of
specific questions about the dynamics of such a system given certain as-
sumptions. Drawing on the results of several different models that have
been constructed to address several such questions, one can arrive at a
robust theorem. Such a theorem is not one that scientists would stake
their careers on, but if one can discharge the assumptions of the different
models, one can say that such theorems are indirectly or partially con-
firmed. The claim that there is a trade-off between the three virtues does
not amount to the logical claim that it is impossible to maximize all three,
but a pragmatic one (Wimsatt 1981; Odenbaugh 2004). Sometimes pop-
ulation biologists sacrifice precision because they want a characterization
of the key dynamics of the system, without predictive accuracy. This is
one stage in indirect confirmation of a robust theorem, which is often the
best one can get in sciences that are attempting to answer questions about
complex, dynamic processes with multiple interacting causes (Weisberg
n.d.).
My claim in this paper is that this strategy is one that is often used in
the context of evolutionary genetics. In order to demonstrate this, I must
first explicate two distinctions Orzack and Sober make early on in the
paper, between models “as mathematical truths” and models “as empirical
claims.” Sober and Orzack introduce this distinction as follows:
Consider any mathematical model said to describe or explain a par-
ticular phenomenon. The first distinction is the one between the
model as a mathematical statement and the model as an empirical
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claim about part of the physical world. Within the second class, we
can distinguish models whose parameter values are left unspecified
and those whose values are specified. (1993, 535)
Orzack and Sober’s example of a mathematical statement is the fol-
lowing. They ask us to consider a one-locus, two-allele model of viability
selection in a diploid population. Three genotypes AA, Aa, and aa are
assigned fitnesses wAA, wAa, and waa. “It is,” they write, “a mathe-
matical truth that if selection is the only force acting in the population,
then a stable polymorphism will occur when wAa 1 wAA, waa.”
Surely it is a true mathematical statement that any system so described
will reach equilibrium. But this is not simply mathematical analysis; this
model refers to empirical features of a system, such that this sort of
analysis will serve any number of roles in confirming some empirical
hypothesis at some later stage of the game. Analytical modeling of this
sort may generate quite novel and surprising discoveries. For example,
one might find that traits evolving under sexual selection are less likely
to be sex-linked than autosomal (Kirkpatrick, personal communication).
Theoretical models like this one (given that the assumptions are empiri-
cally well supported) may be used as evidence supporting assumptions in
other contexts. And even when the assumptions are false, they can provide
us with useful information about the constraints on various kinds of
processes (Wimsatt 1987, 2002). This is why scientists are as interested (if
not more interested) in discoveries of this sort as novel empirical obser-
vations. They want to understand what sorts of things are likely, possible,
and necessary under certain assumptions. Understanding the dynamics
of a system under some description, especially one that is enormously
difficult to manipulate, requires the construction of an analytical model.
When a system is complex, such as a population of interbreeding organ-
isms, one useful means of discovering these properties of the system is to
artificially “hold” other aspects of the world constant in an idealized
mathematical model, allowing the model to count as a kind of artificial
“bottle” experiment to test a hypothesis. This is a central strategy for
posing and answering different kinds of questions in theoretical biology.
It is in just such contexts that we might prefer a more general, but perhaps
less precise, model. Moreover, depending on the question such a model
is designed to answer, the standards for evaluation of analytical models
such as this are rather different from the standards used to evaluate models
built so as to generate very specific predictions for testing empirical claims.
According to Orzack and Sober, there are not distinct “types” of models
with distinct “aspirations.” However, Levins’ point is not that these mod-
els per se are different, but that the construction of models exemplifying
these different virtues enables scientists to answer different kinds of in-
q2
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direct questions about some system. These are stages in what Levins and,
subsequently, Wimsatt will call “robustness” analysis. While I agree with
Orzack and Sober that there are not different “types” of models per se,
I think that the subtler Levins thesis is correct. There are different kinds
of questions we might pursue and thus different strategies to model
building.
2. Classical versus Molecular Evolutionary Genetics. An examination of
modeling in classical population genetics and molecular evolutionary ge-
netics is illustrative of this contrast. Though the two fields are overlapping
more and more, there are some important and interesting contrasts to be
made between them. Classical population genetics models are primarily
prospective; the assumptions are idealized and often, strictly speaking,
false. Many of the analytical models constructed by population genetics
test general claims about the dynamics of evolution under certain as-
sumptions. They give general answers about evolutionary processes under
certain idealized conditions.
Molecular evolutionary genetics models, for the most part, have been
developed in the last 40 years to test very specific empirical hypotheses
about rates of evolution, sequence divergence, and inter- and intraspecific
variation. Many of these models are retrospective; beginning with a se-
quence, one makes inferences about time to the most recent common
ancestor or compares rates of change across sequences. In other words,
the premium is on generating a model so that an empirical hypothesis
can be disambiguated from data. What are studied are the products of
evolutionary processes rather than the processes themselves.
One important lesson to be gained from Levins is the way in which
theory-driven and empirically based models can be used jointly to un-
derstand the causes of some pattern or process in nature. Especially when
we are investigating a process that occurs over very long time scales, with
multiple causes, we may not be able to do the sort of “turn the crank”
kind of confirmation that Orzack and Sober seem to endorse. Rather, we
take several different models, some more general and some more precise,
and arrive at, if not the exact explanation of some state of affairs, the
most likely one.
Analytic models can serve to provide mathematical derivations of
simple, necessary generalizations about evolutionary dynamics. For ex-
ample, here is an elegant argument made by Kimura (1968). Kimura
found that:
The rate of substitution or number of mutants reaching fixation per
unit time (K) equals the rate of mutation, for neutral mutations.
Substitution of neutral mutations is independent of population size.
q4
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How did he arrive at this result? Imagine that there are mutations that
are entirely neutral in their effects. They appear at a certain rate, u, in a
population of organisms of some size, N. The rate at which such neutral
mutations arise per generation in a diploid population at some particular
locus will be 2Nu per generation. The probability of fixation of these
mutations will be . The reason is that for neutral mutations,Pp 1/2N
the probability of fixation is equal to its initial frequency ( ); one1/2N
neutral mutation has a chance of becoming fixed in a population equal
to that of any other neutral mutation (assuming perfectly independent
assortment and no linkage!). (Its probability of being lost is much higher
[ , approximately one]; but it does have a small chance of(2N 1)/2N
success.) Finally, the rate of substitution of new mutations is just the rate
at which they arise times the probability of fixation, . WhenKp 2NuP
we substitute for P, we get . Or the rate of substitution of1/2N Kp u
neutral alleles is just equal to their rate of mutation and independent of
population size.
What is the status of this argument and conclusion? First, the argument
is a simple mathematical derivation. As such, the conclusion is a true
mathematical statement, , a` la Orzack and Sober. The derivationKp u
is a true mathematical statement, but it entails a true (counterfactual)
empirical claim. That is, if the assumptions of the model hold, we now
know an empirical fact to also hold: that the rate of substitution of neutral
mutations equals the mutation rate. And we can use this analytic result
to answer other empirical questions.
Notice how many idealizing (or false) assumptions are in Kimura’s
conditional. Were there to be an entirely neutral mutation, then the chance
of substitution equals the rate of mutation. We must assume perfect neu-
trality, and that change in one nucleotide site is independent of changes
at other sites. This is almost never, strictly speaking, true. This is, as it
were, a general and precise, but unrealistic, model.
According to Orzack and Sober, we should improve on such a model
by adding in more parameters, perhaps. But, depending on the context
of application of such a result, the assumptions can be discharged; in
other words, the assumptions are harmless if they are irrelevant to the
empirical hypothesis we’re interested in testing. In this case, the important
function of this model is as a null model. One assumes this equality to
hold, and then a failure of this equality is taken to indicate nonneutral
evolution.
The Kimura model permits construction of data-driven models in the
context of molecular evolutionary genetics. For instance, consider the
MacDonald-Kreitman test (1991). In 1991, MacDonald and Kreitman
developed a test to determine whether most of the mutations that have
contributed to genetic variation in populations were neutral or nearly
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neutral. The test compares degrees of polymorphism within and between
species. The neutral theory predicts that the variation within populations
and the differences between populations are mainly due to neutral or
nearly neutral mutations. The rate of molecular evolution indicated by
comparisons between species should be positively correlated with within-
population variation.
MacDonald and Kreitman originally applied their test to the alcohol
dehydrogenase gene in two closely related species of Drosophila. For the
two species, they measured the number of fixed differences for replacement
and silent nucleotide changes and divided one by the other to get a ratio.
They also measured polymorphism within each species for replacement
and silent sites and expressed this as a ratio. The two ratios should be
equal if all the changes are neutral. This is so because the rate of neutral
evolution equals the mutation rate, and the ratio of species differences
for replacement and silent sites should therefore equal the ratio of neutral
replacement changes versus neutral silent sites.
They found a high ratio of fixed replacement site to synonymous or
silent sites. The best explanation of this, they argued, was adaptive
fixation.
3. Critique and Reply. Orzack and Sober reply that this argument con-
founded a number of issues (personal communication). First, they will
not disagree that one might use models as proofs of principle. Indeed,
Sober has drawn attention to several examples of this strategy in earlier
work (Sober 1984). However, this use of modeling is properly part of the
“context of discovery,” not the “context of justification.” Their critique,
Sober alleges (personal communication), was of Levins’ claim to distinct-
ness of the variety of models in the context of justification.
However, I think that this is exactly why Orzack and Sober have missed
the thrust of Levins’ piece. In the actual practice of science, there are
many cases in which a scientist’s deployment of a model is not restricted
to one context alone. The derivation of a mathematical statement may
constitute a kind of “discovery” (if they like) about the constraints on
processes, but the same mathematical statement may be used as one stage
along the way to confirmation of some independent empirical hypothesis,
as illustrated above.
Second, Levins was talking of strategies of model building, not models
per se. That is, he was interested in why scientists build models, not just
the models themselves, and how their choice of modeling strategy reflected
the kind of question they wished to answer. Scientists are interested in
answering questions about not only whether some model accurately re-
flects the world, but also whether or not some pattern or process is general,
likely, possible, or necessary, given some initial conditions. Filing the
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answers under the distinct and exclusive contexts of “discovery” or “con-
firmation” is, I think, not an easy task.
Finally, Orzack and Sober might argue that the contrast I make between
modeling in classical population genetics and in molecular evolutionary
genetics is an “apples and oranges” comparison. I take this to mean that
both sorts of models address both theoretical problems and empirical
questions. Of course, both do indeed do so. My claim was not that they
exclusively do one or the other. Rather, my claim was that the former,
“more often than not,” aims to address questions about general pro-
spective patterns and processes in evolution, at some remote from the
data. This is so for a rather significant historical reason: when Haldane
(1924a, 1924b), Wright (1931), and Fisher (1930) first developed these
models, they did not know the structure or means of transmission of the
hereditary materials. Thus, these models were necessarily “as if” models—
making a number of assumptions about how evolutionary change can
and should be represented at the genetic level. Many of the same modeling
strategies that were initiated by these authors are still used today in the-
oretical population genetics. These kinds of models address very theo-
retical “as if” questions exactly because they are theory-laden models:
they assume that traits may be represented by changes in allele frequency
in our models, for instance, or that assortment is independent. We now
have very good reason to be suspicious of these assumptions. Nonetheless,
for the purposes of addressing broad general questions about the evo-
lutionary process, such theoretical models are enormously useful.
In molecular evolutionary genetics, in contrast, I argued that such mod-
els are “for the most part” developed to test very specific empirical hy-
potheses about rates of evolution, sequence divergence, and so forth. The
reason why this is so is that these models are constructed with the data,
as it were, “in front of them.” While there is significant overlap between
the models in classical and molecular genetics, there are significant dif-
ferences. As Ewens (2004, 288) remarks, “To some extent the purely math-
ematical theory [classical population genetic theory] carries through to
the molecular level, with the nucleotide frequency replacing the gene fre-
quency as the primary variable, but clearly, new models and viewpoints,
as well as new ‘typical’ values of various fundamental parameters, are
necessary at the molecular level.” However, he also remarks on the con-
trasts:
Molecular theory is “dynamic” as opposed to “static”—mutations
lead to new allelic types rather than back to current or previously
existent types.
The assumption that different sites within one gene evolve indepen-
dently is particularly questionable.
q5
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The actual genetic material is known.
Molecular considerations are retrospective as opposed to prospective.
Molecular evolutionary genetics is, in some sense, tracking a different
kind of process—changes at the level of single base pairs—than that en-
visioned by the founders of classical population genetics. And they are
working, not from “as if” assumptions, but from databases that allow
them to compare actual genetic variation in different populations and
retrodictively derive the causal story that leads to that pattern of variation.
Thus their models are more often “data driven” in the sense that they
are working from the data in construction of models rather than working
from “as if” assumptions about heredity and evolution.
4. Conclusion. On the one hand, the aim of model building in classical
population genetics is more often than not the production of models that
provide proof of principles. On the other hand, the aim of model building
in molecular evolutionary genetics is to find a way to evaluate data con-
cerning very specific empirical hypotheses.
Sober and Orzack are correct that there are not distinct “types” of
models in the sense that the same model can exhibit type II or type III
characteristics, depending on the mode of application. However, the sub-
tler reading of Levins—namely, that there are distinct functions of that
modeling serves at different stages in scientific inquiry—seems more
plausible.
By deemphasizing the merely “mathematical” part of the work of the-
oretical modeling, Sober and Orzack shift the focus to confirmation and
testing. Thus, the stages of model building, where one builds a “scaffold”
or derives mathematical relationships that enable one to make counter-
factual claims about the dynamics of evolution, are merely preliminary.
However, I wish to suggest that this part of the modeling process satisfies
a different set of aims that are significant to both theory testing and
determining what will count as adequate tests of the theory. Thus they
are not “distinct from” the context of justification, insofar as they deter-
mine the very conditions on the possibility of justification and frequently
do themselves justify assumptions made in testing empirical claims in other
contexts. As Wimsatt (1987, 2004) has argued, less realistic models often
function to provide information about constraints on processes. Or use
of several such “analytic” models can allow the derivation of robust the-
orems. And when analyzing systems with many moving parts, robustness
analysis can give us, if not confirmation, then something near enough.
q8
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QUERIES TO THE AUTHOR
1 This is listed as Sober and Orzack in the References. Which order is
correct? Throughout the paper you use both name orders. Will need to
be changed in many places.
2 Page no. of quotation?
3 For completeness, “as interested in” requires “as” and “more inter-
ested in” requires “than.” To avoid this construction, I moveD the “more”
part into parentheses. Ok?
4 Are these direct quotes from Kimura? If so, please supply page nos.
5 For completeness, “between” requires “and.” Change ok? Or perhaps
“contrasting modeling in classical population genetics and in molecular
evolutionary genetics is an ‘apples and oranges’ comparison”?
6 “Remote” is not used as a noun in this sense. Perhaps “somewhat
remotely from the data” or “at some distance [or some such noun] from
the data”?
7 Are these direct quotations from Ewens? If so, please supply page
nos.
8 Something missing here? There are too many verbs. Perhaps “distinct
functions of modeling that serve at”?
9 Wimsatt (2002) as in the Refs? Or another source that needs to be
added?
10 first name of Provine?
